In January 2017, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal found Mr Gullquist guilty of professional misconduct within the meaning of s 4.4.3(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2004. The tribunal had found that Mr Gullquist had engaged in conduct that involved a substantial failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence.

The professional misconduct related to five letters Mr Gullquist had sent to a local court in NSW while proceedings were underway. Three of the letters were personally addressed to the magistrate and had not been copied to Mr Gullquist’s opponent.

VCAT ordered Mr Gullquist’s reprimanding under s 4.4.19(k) of the Legal Profession Act 2004. He was required also to undertake “an additional five CPD units in ethics and professional responsibilities’ over the following 12 months” and limited in his ability to “send correspondence addressed to judicial or quasi-judicial officers without first obtaining the approval of a senior practitioner” who was approved by the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner.

At the time of the letters being sent, Mr Gullquist was acting for the second defendant in a local court matter in NSW.

The second letter, and the one that the Court of Appeal judges took the most notice of was dated 23 March, after the conclusion of the hearing for the case, and prior to the judgment’s delivery on 10 April.

This letter was addressed to the magistrate via the Chief Magistrate’s Executive Office email address, and cc’d to the Judicial Commission of NSW.

The letter included the following:

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“In my 35 years of a senior legal and business career (although, as I am sure will have been evident to you, mainly not spent as an advocate) I have extremely rarely felt at the conclusion of a hearing that the issues were not fairly heard — but I did in this instance. I was unable to honestly report to my client that I could discern that his application received a fair hearing.”

Mr Gullquisty also said “with the utmost respect for your Honour and the position which you hold, consistency was entirely not in evidence during the hearing.”

He continued with “the inconsistency was on a scale I have never before witnessed and the proceeding was characterized by almost every submission I made being critically scrutinized and repeatedly challenged even to the point of culling paragraphs of my client’s affidavit material which were and remain, based on the authorities cited, plainly relevant.”

In the letter’s conclusion, Mr Gullquist said “the arguments of opposing counsel regarding the ultimate place of receipt of the payments made in Victoria under the subject agreement will be readily apparent to Your Honour from his written submissions.”

“This document forms my corresponding written submission,” he noted.

“It will be further evident to your Honour that I do not accept that refusing my request to be also allowed to file a written submission was either fair or in the interests of justice nor satisfying the requisite provision of natural justice to my client.”

At the magistrate’s request, a copy of the letter was sent to Mr Gullquist’s opponent.

Further correspondence between Mr Gullquist, his opponent and the judiciary required consideration.

At the VCAT hearing, senior counsel for Mr Gullquist conceded the letters infringed legal obligations, which additionally “it was conceded that this conduct amounted to unsatisfactory professional conduct.”

Ultimately, the tribunal found all five letters sent by Mr Gullquist breached relevant rules, with member Wentworth finding “all of the letters were in breach of the relevant rules.”

“While I did not find that the 23 March letter, when read as a whole, was threatening, it came close,” the judgment continued.

“I am in any event satisfied and find that it was wholly inappropriate and, of itself, is capable of constituting professional misconduct, including by the fact that it was not copied to Mr Gullquist ’s opponent.”

“It raised serious questions about Mr Gullquist ’s professional judgment and competence.”

Member Wentworth found “the conduct as a whole represented a substantial failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence and was thus within the definition of professional misconduct in s 4.4.3(1)(a) of the act.”

In his application for leave to appeal against the original refusal to grant leave, Mr Gullquist’s application contained 17 numbered grounds of appeal, which Tate JA, Beach JA and McLeish JA said “some of which comprise more than one discrete ground.”

At the hearing’s commencement, Mr Gullqusit made application to admit a letter addressed to himself from the Victorian Legal Services Board into evidence. It was submitted that the letter was relevant “because it showed that VCAT’s determination was having a continuing effect on his right to practise as a solicitor.”

In the judges’ view, the “admission of the letter would have no capacity to affect the outcome of any of Mr Gullquist’s proposed grounds of appeal”, and that the “letter cannot provide a stand-alone basis for granting” a leave to appeal.

In the judgment, the judges agreed that “if Mr Gullquist could show that his appeal had a real prospect of success, we would grant him leave to appeal without relying upon the further evidence he sought to have admitted.”

However, “having considered all of Mr Gullquist ’s arguments advanced in support of his proposed appeal,” they “concluded that his appeal has no real prospect of success.”

“The 23 March letter provided the core component of the course of conduct charge and the sending of the other letters demonstrated that the failure to reach a reasonable standard of competence and diligence did not occur in isolation but was part of a collective pattern of behaviour.”

Ultimately, an order was made refusing Mr Gullquist’s application for leave to appeal.