A woman who alleged she was sexually harassed at a Queensland law firm was barred from bringing any further claims.
The Supreme Court of Queensland dismissed a claim brought by a former employee of Hartley Healy who alleged she was sexually harassed by an employed solicitor over five months in 2015 and 2016.
Following a conciliation conference in April 2017, the woman entered an in-principle settlement that included a $30,000 sum and a condition that she not make any further claims against the firm in connection with the allegations or the cessation of her employment.
The woman initially commenced a claim with WorkCover but withdrew it in October 2016 because it was causing her distress.
The firm has “substantively disputed” the harassment allegations.
The woman has since alleged Hartley Healy breached its tortious duty of care and committed a breach of contract.
Justice Tom Sullivan was tasked with determining whether the deed of settlement meant the woman had released and discharged the firm from the proceeding, and if it meant she was barred from the claim.
In her submissions, the woman claimed the breach of duty claim and breach of contract claim were claims for “statutory benefits under the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003” (WCR Act) and, accordingly, were not released and discharged by the deed.
While it was conceded the act could not provide a cause of action or entitlement to damages, she claimed it was “apparent from the statutory claim that a worker can only claim those damages in accordance with the statutory scheme itself”.
She added that as the act controlled the elements of the causes of action and the relief available to her, “it therefore conferred the right to claim damages so as to reinforce that the plaintiff’s claims under the current proceedings were ones which existed by virtue of the WCR Act and were therefore ‘under’ that statute”.
Justice Sullivan did not agree, finding that all clauses of action within the current proceeding were released and discharged under the deed.
“The release and discharge clause itself was part of the price which was paid for the benefits which were bargained for from the defendant. Those benefits included the payment of $30,000.
“If that bargain has subsequently come to be viewed as a bad bargain, that change of view does not provide a basis for the court to rewrite the clear words of the contract in a way which is not open on the text of the relevant clause,” Justice Sullivan said.
