The taxation of legal fees allegedly owed to major firm MinterEllison was stalled by a number of complaints, including an objection to a judicial officer whose wife used to be employed at the firm.
Due to complaints made against judicial officers within the Supreme Court of South Australia, the taxation of legal fees allegedly owed to MinterEllison by Natale Lauro “has not progressed very far”.
In the most recent proceedings before Court of Appeal president Justice Mark Livesey and Justice Christopher Bleby, Lauro – assisted by his son and litigation guardian Eric Lauro – filed an application for leave to appeal, concerning an objection to the taxation judges.
The Lauros also pursued an objection to a single judge of the general division sitting on appeal of decisions made by the taxing judges. The appeal judge refused leave to appeal and dismissed the leave needed to appeal decisions made by Justices Livesey and Bleby.
When the matter was set down, it was disclosed that both Justices Livesey and Bleby were retained as barristers for MinterEllison.
Further, Justice Livesey disclosed his wife had been, but was no longer, an employed solicitor of MinterEllison. There was no involvement by either Justice Livesey or his wife in the Lauro litigation.
Justices Bleby and Livesey said a fair-minded lay observer would understand barristers “will advise and represent a number of clients when acting on instructions from a range of solicitors”.
The fact of those retainers “does not provide any reason to think that, in the event of appointment as a judge, that kind of former association with a solicitors’ firm some years earlier will, without more, give rise to the requisite apprehension,” the decision set out.
The bench added that it was also difficult to see how Justice Livesey’s familial association could support a complaint of ostensible bias when neither he nor his wife had any involvement, financial interest, or reputational interest in the matter’s outcome.
As for the complaint against the appeal judge, a number of matters were agitated, including a tense exchange about a possible appeal.
A number of matters were agitated against the appeal judge, including a tense exchange about the possibility of another appeal.
Explaining this, the appeal judge said that while a judge may express themselves in a way they may later regret, there was no prohibition against them conveying initial, but negative, reactions to something that is said or dissatisfaction with a party’s performance.
“It is only where the conduct demonstrates such hostility or rigidity that a fair-minded observer might doubt the judge’s preparedness to properly consider competing arguments that the conduct gives rise to apprehended bias,” the appeal judge said.
Justices Livesey and Bleby said it was not obvious the appeal judge made any error of fact or law or overlooked any relevant and material consideration.
Further, Lauro has not identified “any reason to doubt or reconsider the decisions made by the appeal judge”.
The case: Lauro v Minter Ellison (a firm) [2025] SASCA 116.
Naomi Neilson is a senior journalist with a focus on court reporting for Lawyers Weekly.
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