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The legal profession needs to be trauma- and dissociation-informed in the courtroom and throughout the legal process, write experienced clinicians and researchers.
In July 2026, a convicted paedophile was granted leave to appeal a 21-year jail sentence handed down in December 2024 in the Newcastle District Court [1]. The grounds of the appeal were that his daughter, with a diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder (DID), had different Parts of her personality system (Parts) sworn in to give evidence. The appeal argues that these Parts are not recognised by law and their swearing in should not have been allowed. This case extends from a landmark 2019 case in which Jeni Haynes, who has DID, gave a victim impact statement from different Parts at her father’s sentencing for childhood sexual abuse and torture [2]. In Hayne’s case, the Parts were not sworn in to give evidence.
We do not comment on the crimes for which these men have been convicted. Rather, as clinicians and researchers in the field of dissociative disorders, we see an urgent need to respond to the notion of treating the Parts of a person with DID as if they are separate people both in general and during legal processes. To treat Parts as if they are separate people is factually incorrect and a misunderstanding of the mechanisms underpinning DID.
Clinical presentations of dissociated identities have been medically documented and treated for over 130 years by some of the greatest minds in the history of psychology (e.g., Binet, Charcot, Janet, James, Ferenczi, and Watkins). A conceptualisation consistent across time is that dissociated identities are not literally separate people, despite some individuals with DID having a subjective experience of feeling like they are. Rather, they are sophisticated psychological coping mechanisms to cope with severe trauma. For a traumatised child, dissociating painful aspects of their experience into other identities can allow them to continue daily life by keeping the trauma out of mind. It can also allow them to preserve attachment to family members, some of whom may be abusers.
While dissociation has adaptive qualities, there are limitations that can affect clinical and legal processes. Because different Parts may have access to different perceptions of their personal history which can lead to contradictory beliefs and memories, it may seem intuitive to have each give evidence. But this stance treats Parts as separate people, rather than aspects of one person. Most people with DID negotiate daily life, including relationships, study, work, and even appearing in court, without overt switching or acting as if they are separate people, most commonly by communicating between Parts internally, or switching unobtrusively. If they can traverse such varied landscapes, why would they need to formally switch into a particular nominated identity in a courtroom? Why would different Parts need to be treated as different people and sworn in to give separate testimonies?
Additionally, not all people with DID can switch between Parts on demand, nor should they be expected to have that quality to receive a fair court hearing and achieve justice. A person with DID switching on command in court may inadvertently reveal material about their past life and psychological treatment that is not pertinent to the legal matter at hand. This could prompt ‘fishing expeditions’ by a cross-examining barrister gifted with a range of opportunities to introduce doubt about the witness’s credibility.
Further, in Australia, section 13(3) of the Evidence Act 1995 states a person is not competent to give sworn evidence if they do not have the capacity to understand that they are under an obligation to give truthful evidence. Because a five-year-old child typically lacks the developmental capacity to understand the formal legal and abstract concept of a courtroom oath or affirmation, they would normally not be sworn in [3,4]. So, if Parts are treated as separate people, a ‘child’ Part would be considered a child with all the legal ramifications that brings.
It is one thing to switch in a planned way or spontaneously in therapy with a supportive, trained therapist. It is very different to attempt switching on command for a legal cross-examination that may be experienced as hostile and elicit further switching to defend the self. Despite progress in responding to alleged victim-survivors of child sexual abuse and adult rape, the courtroom is still far from a safe or accommodating environment for victim-survivors with integrated ego states, let alone someone with DID.
Finally, if we are to extend this notion of legally treating people with DID as if they contain separate people, what would happen if a person with dissociated identities engages in a crime? The legal system would be faced with a conundrum: How does the ‘criminal identity’ serve their punishment while avoiding the grave miscarriage of justice associated with ‘non-offending identities’ also ‘doing the time’. If different Parts disagree with the truth or accuracy of events, which version represents the ‘facts’ of the person’s experience?
Different Parts being sworn in to give evidence as separate identities is misleading and medically and psychologically incorrect. It is a conceptual error, and in the authors’ view, unethical. It risks misrepresenting DID, which has serious clinical and legal ramifications. It could lead to destabilising the witness in and out of the courtroom, with the potential of manipulating witness testimony or discrediting testimony.
DID is a diagnosis that is often misunderstood, with portrayals in films and high-profile legal cases sensationalised and misleading to the public. How DID is handled in prosecutions and defences needs to align with current psychological conceptualisations and ethical practice. This necessitates the legal profession to be trauma-and dissociation-informed in the courtroom and throughout the legal process rather than risk negative legal and psychological outcomes.
References:
Convicted paedophile argues multiple-personality evidence unlawful in appeal. Giselle Wakatama, 13 July 2026, ABC Online
Dissociative Identity Disorder: The woman who created 2,500 personalities to survive. Frances Mao, 6 September 2019, BBC Online
Court allows witness with dissociative identity disorder to give evidence in multiple personalities Giselle Wakatama, 5 December 2024, ABC Online
Children’s competence to testify in Australian courts: implementing the royal commission recommendation, S. P. Brubacher,N. Hodgson,J. Goodmandelahunty, M. B. Powell & N. Westera, UNSW Law Journal, Volume 42(4), 2019
Authors:
Naomi Halpern, CQSW (UK), Grad. Cert. Human Rights, Fellow: International Society for Study of Trauma and Dissociation. Director Delphi Training and Consulting
Kate McMaugh, BPsych, MPsych (Clin), Master Health Science, PGDip. Health Promotion, Grad. Cert. Professional Psychology, Fellow: International Society for Study of Trauma and Dissociation. Private Practice
Diane Clare, BA, MA (Hons), PG Dip Clinical Psychology, Fellow: International Society for Study of Trauma and Dissociation. Assoc. Fellow British Psych Society. Private Practice
Professor Martin Dorahy, PhD, DClinPsych, School of Psychology, Speech and Hearing, University of Canterbury, Faculty of Science. Fellow: International Society for Study of Trauma and Dissociation. Private Practice
Professor Warwick Middleton, AM, MB BS, FRANZCP, MD, Middleton - Ali Psychiatric Services, Professor, School of Medicine, University of Queensland, Adjunct Prof. School of Public Health, La Trobe University, School of Behavioural, Cognitive & Social Sciences, University of New England, and School of Psychology, Speech and Hearing, University of Canterbury, Fellow: International Society for Study of Trauma and Dissociation.
